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'Didden v. Port Chester':
Placing Eminent Domain Debate in Proper Perspective
Written for Publication in the New York Law Journal
February 21, 2007

John R. Nolon and Jessica A. Bacher
[John Nolon is a Professor at Pace University School of Law, Counsel to its Land
Use Law Center, and Visiting Professor at Yale’s School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies. Jessica Bacher is an Adjunct Professor at Pace
University School of Law and a Staff Attorney for the Land Use Law Center.]
Abstract: Controversy often arises when landowners in blighted areas resist
government driven urban-renewal condemnation of their property. Often, these
urban-renewal areas, the scope of which is determined after extensive study, are
condemned and transferred to a private developer who has an overall plan for
the entire designated area. This article discusses the issues that arise when
private property interests are overridden by public interests and how urban
renewal will help revitalize the economies of troubled inner-city regions.
***
When the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari on January 16, 2007 in
the case of Didden v. Port Chester, it extinguished the last hope of a property
owner whose land development aspirations were frustrated by the urban renewal
process. No. 06-652, 2007 U.S. LEXIS 1036 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2007). The case has
attracted a fraction of the media attention of the Kelo v. New London case in
which the Court upheld the taking of private property for the public purpose of
pursuing an area-wide development project under Connecticut's municipal
development statute. 545 U.S. 469 (2005); see CONN. GEN STAT. § 8-186. The
Didden case, like Kelo, is consistent with decided precedent; however, both
cases raise public policy concerns regarding the reach of the power of eminent
domain.
Didden and his partners owned various adjoining parcels that were partly
inside and partly outside the Village of Port Chester’s formally-established urban
renewal area. They made plans to develop their property as a CVS Pharmacy,
sought and received various development approvals from local land use boards,
and entered into a lease with CVS. In order to proceed with their development,
they had to secure the release of the parcels that were inside the urban renewal
area from village constraints. The village had designated G & S Port Chester
LLC the redeveloper of the urban renewal area giving it control over the use of all
land within the area. Negotiations between the Didden group and G & S failed
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and the village then approved the condemnation of the inside properties allowing
G & S to develop them in accordance with the village’s adopted urban renewal
plan. Didden sued seeking a stay of the condemnation proceedings as well as
declaratory and monetary relief. Didden v. Port Chester, 304 F. Supp. 2d 548
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); Didden v. Port Chester, 322 F. Supp. 2d 385 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York was asked
to declare that the condemnation of the Didden property pursued a private
interest, that of G & S, rather than a public purpose as required by the Fifth
Amendment.
Both Port Chester and New London are small, distressed communities
with a history of high poverty and unemployment in the midst of surrounding
affluence. Port Chester had attempted various revitalization strategies in its 27acre downtown and waterfront area without success for over 20 years before
designating G & S as the qualified and eligible developer of the area in 1998.
Consistent with General Municipal Law provisions, Port Chester adopted an
urban renewal plan calling for the development of the land in phases and entered
into a Land Acquisition and Disposition Agreement (LADA) with G & S enabling it
to acquire and redevelop the property. The plan called for the provision of
approximately 500,000 square feet of retail establishments including a Costco
warehouse store, movie theater, department store, Bed, Bath & Beyond, and a
number of additional stores and enterprises. The goal was to provide jobs,
increase the limited tax base of the village, and stimulate economic revitalization
in the surrounding areas. By the time the Court denied certiorari early this year,
development pursuant to the urban renewal plan was well underway.
The policy behind urban renewal is to jump-start stalled local economies in
order to restore economic and social health for the benefit of the citizenry,
including low- and moderate-income families, which tend to congregate in urban
settlements. The public harm caused by blighted urban conditions is extensive
and well documented; it is the aim of urban renewal to restore health to
communities through blight removal strategies such as Port Chester’s. The
intransigence of urban blight explains, in part, the extraordinary powers
delegated to municipalities under urban renewal law. The power of government
to delegate the implementation of redevelopment plans to publicly-selected
private companies recognizes the complexity of land acquisition and
redevelopment financing and execution: a job better undertaken by experienced
development companies than by public bodies. Blight elimination and urban
revitalization are the public purposes that justify the taking of private property
under the Fifth Amendment and comparable provisions of state law.
Municipalities in New York receive their urban renewal powers under
Articles 15 and 15-A of the General Municipal Law. Under these provisions,
municipalities are authorized to conduct blight studies, define the boundaries of
blighted neighborhoods, designate them as urban renewal areas, draft and
approve an urban renewal plan, issue a request for proposals from private
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developers interested in building pursuant to the plan, designate a qualified and
eligible redeveloper, and then authorize that redeveloper to acquire parcels in the
area and develop them in accordance with the plan. Should any of the private
parcel owners in the area not be willing to sell their land voluntarily, the
municipality, or its urban renewal agency, is authorized by Article 15 and 15-A to
acquire those parcels by eminent domain.
All of these steps must be taken following public notice and public hearing
and are subject to judicial review. All procedures and standards contained in
New York’s Eminent Domain Procedures Law (EDPL) must be followed in
condemning title to properties in urban renewal areas. Pursuant to these
provisions, the Village of Port Chester provided public notice of a public hearing
on the adoption of the urban renewal plan. Following the public hearing, on July
14, 1999, the board of trustees adopted a resolution making a finding of public
purpose under Article 2 of the EDPL, approving the LADA, and designating G &
S as the qualified and eligible redeveloper for the urban renewal project. The
project called for the acquisition of over 38 properties.
EDPL § 207 allows affected landowners to appeal the public purpose
findings of a condemning authority within 30 days. The Didden group’s judicial
action, which was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was commenced in January,
2004. The statute of limitations applicable to § 1983 claims in New York is three
years. When the statute of limitations accrues is a question of federal law.
The district court noted that the Didden group proceeded with its CVS
project, including securing local land use approvals, knowing that G & S had the
authority to buy or have the village condemn its parcels. Didden, 304 F. Supp.
2d at 553. The group met several times with G & S to try to negotiate an
arrangement that would allow them to proceed with their agreement with CVS.
Plaintiffs allege that during these negotiations G & S demanded that they pay
$800,000 as the price for releasing the land from its control. Didden alleged that
G & S used its authority under the LADA to seek condemnation of the property to
extort funds. G & S argued that the parties negotiated reasonably about the
value of the CVS venture and explored options for pursuing it. These
negotiations failed to result in an agreement and on November 3rd Port Chester
commenced a condemnation proceeding. Plaintiffs requested that the village
withdraw the proceedings, but after holding special meetings, the request was
denied.
In its January, 2004 petition to the district court, the plaintiffs argued that
the village and G & S “conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of the use of their property
in order to pursue their own private interests—specifically, their development
plans with Walgreens—rather than the interests of the public.” Didden, 304 F.
Supp. 2d at 557.
On January 23, 2004, the district court denied plaintiffs’
request for a preliminary injunction. On May 24, 2004, the district court granted
defendants’ motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The court held that all
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of plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred. The three-year statute of limitations period
applicable to § 1983 claims began to run when Port Chester made its public
purpose finding on July 14, 1999. At that point, plaintiffs had reason to know of
the basis for their injury because they were fully aware that the finding of public
purpose exposed their property to the possibility of condemnation. Accordingly,
the triggering of the statute of limitations was not delayed until November, 2003,
when G & S allegedly attempted to exact a cash payment from plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs claimed they were not aware that EDPL § 207 required that
appeals of public purpose findings be made within 30 days. The plaintiffs
conceded that they received notice of the public hearing in July of 1999 and,
under law, were charged with knowledge of the procedures established for
judicial review. Since they received notice and failed to challenge the village’s
public purpose findings, they lost their right to contest the validity of those
findings. The district court also found that plaintiffs’ claim that G & S attempted
to extort payments from the plaintiffs had no legal significance. It noted that “[a]s
Plaintiffs themselves assert in their Complaint, G & S . . . ha[s] the authority
under the LADA to obligate Port Chester to pursue condemnation of properties
within the Project’s boundaries. Threats to enforce a party’s legal rights are not
actionable.” Didden, 322 F. Supp. 2d at 390.
On April 5, 2006, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
on the statute of limitations noting that the plaintiffs would not have succeeded
even if their action were not time-barred. Didden v. Port Chester, No. 04-3485CV, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8653 (2d Cir. April 5, 2006). Citing Kelo v. New
London, the court declined to substitute its judgment for that of the village. Id., at
*5. In Kelo, the court noted: “Just as we decline to second-guess the City’s
considered judgments about the efficacy of its development plan, we also decline
to second-guess the City’s determinations as to what lands it needs to acquire in
order to effectuate the project.” Id. (quoting Kelo, 545 U.S. at 488). Because G &
S was fully authorized to proceed with the acquisition of the plaintiff’s property
under the plan, its position in voluntary negotiations undertaken with the plaintiffs
was not “an unconstitutional exaction in the form of extortion.” Didden, No. 043485-CV, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 8653, at *5. In other words, the district court
was correct in finding that any attempt by G & S to exact a cash payment from
the plaintiffs did not constitute a cognizable injury.
Conclusion:
Some critics of the Didden case raise concerns that designated
redevelopers have too much power under the urban renewal process. G & S
used that power, they assert, to advance its private interests to the prejudice of
those of the plaintiffs. G & S had negotiated with CVS and failed, then turned to
Walgreens. Meanwhile, the Didden group successfully concluded a deal with
CVS, secured approvals from other local agencies, and was ready to proceed
with the development of the pharmacy. Surely the law that permitted G & S to
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prevail in this private sector struggle advances the private interests of one
developer over another rather than advancing a public purpose as required by
the Fifth Amendment.
The case, when removed from its statutory underpinnings and history, can
be cast as the use of public authority to elevate one private party’s interest over
that of another. Viewed against the backdrop of decades of urban decline and a
statutory structure that provides tools designed to aid the difficult task of urban
regeneration, however, perceptions change. How can area-wide redevelopment
be achieved if private redevelopers are not given the ability to work at a sufficient
scale of operations to reverse decades of blight? How can this ability be limited
to protect the private rights of owners within designated areas without
compromising the market feasibility of redevelopment?
Every statutory
amendment that affords greater protections must consider the tension between
private rights and the greater public interest in urban revitalization.
From a public policy perspective, what, if anything, is wrong with the
procedures and authorities delegated to local governments under Articles 15 and
15-A and the procedures for condemnation set forth in the EDPL? Proposals for
their reform include severe limitations on the use of eminent domain, more and
better planning and public process, lengthier periods of public notice and statutes
of limitation, and higher levels of compensation for the owners of condemned
properties. Each of these reforms has been advanced in the New York
legislature since Kelo was decided. Each proposal raises legitimate questions
about the tension between expeditious and cost-effective action to achieve areawide redevelopment and the rights of individual property owners.
The Didden case provides an excellent opportunity to place the debate
over eminent domain reform in its proper perspective. G & S, and other
redevelopers, are practical proxies for the public interest in urban redevelopment.
Legal provisions that make it possible for redevelopers to build in accordance
with publicly-approved plans, following a transparent public process, should not
be seen as laws that promote private interests. The attempt to charge the
debate in this way obscures the legitimate and critical public stake in our urban
places.
The nation is slowly recovering from a long period of urban decay, which
recovery is due in part to urban revitalization strategies like that adopted by the
Village of Port Chester. The certain consequences of climate change require
greater concentration of urban settlements to conserve energy and mitigate
carbon emissions. If our society does experience serious sea level rise, the law
must provide a means of adaptation. When legislatures hold extensive hearings
to consider urban decay and redevelopment as they did in the 1950s and 1960s
and prescribe a defined public process leading to urban renewal, the courts must
defer to their findings and procedures. This reflects our historical understanding
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of the role of the courts and will serve us well as we confront new challenges
appearing on the horizon.
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